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Definition
Peer competition is a form of social interaction in
which at least two organisms of a peer group strive
to obtain a limited resource or achieve a certain
goal. Peer cooperation is the social interaction
between at least two organisms of a peer group
in which at least one of them acts in a way that
fosters the benefit of other group members,
regardless of whether those actions are beneficial
or not to the actor herself.
Introduction
The study of peer competition and cooperation is
essential for providing a theoretical account of
human nature and its distinctive cognitive and
motivational psychology. Research in these areas
also has important practical implications. An
accurate understanding of peer competition and
cooperation is crucial, for instance, for under-
standing the factors that drive human conflict, as
well as for overcoming the challenges that require
collaborative effort, such as building and
maintaining a large-scale irrigation system for
agricultural production.
Peer competition and peer cooperation can be
intuitively seen as opposing phenomena. How-
ever, depending on multiple factors, they might
be complementary. In a population divided into
groups, for instance, members of each group may
cooperate with their peers in order to compete
with neighboring groups. Alternatively, they
may compete with their peers as a means of choos-
ing the best cooperative partners and demonstrate
that they are reliable cooperative partners. For
instance, if subjects can choose with whom they
wish to interact, this may create competition to be
more generous or loyal than others.
Drawing upon the developmental and compar-
ative psychology literature, this article discusses
the biological and cultural factors influencing the
psychology of peer competition and peer cooper-
ation in humans. Data from comparative psychol-
ogy are useful to address questions about
cognition from a broad evolutionary perspective.
Developmental evidence, in turn, provides crucial
information about how cognitive capacities
emerge during the organism’s life span, which
will help to better illuminate how developmental
trajectories are shaped by evolutionary processes.
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A special emphasis will be given to cooperative
behavior, which, arguably, encompasses the most
distinctive cognitive traits of the human species.
The article ends by examining one of the most
promising avenues of research on the psychology
of peer cooperation: the shared intentionality
hypothesis.
Evolutionary and Psychological
Perspectives of Peer Competition and
Cooperation
Peer competition and peer cooperation each pos-
sess a psychological and an evolutionary dimen-
sion. As such, research can focus on either the
psychological mechanisms of competition and
cooperation or the evolutionary explanations for
them. For example, testosterone levels mediate
competitive behavior when social challenges
need to be confronted, and may also promote
prosocial behaviors when this behavior enhances
social status – e.g., when punishing norm viola-
tors brings reputational benefits to the punisher.
The mechanisms involved in testosterone produc-
tion are shaped by evolutionary forces that often
have cascading effects on other traits. It has been
argued, for example, that selection for increased
social tolerance in the Middle Pleistocene led to a
decrease in testosterone levels (or perhaps
reduced androgen receptor densities), which
resulted in changes in human craniofacial mor-
phology. The evolutionary trajectory of the
hominin lineage seems to be characterized by
both an overall decrease in aggressive behavior
and an increase in social tolerance (Gonzalez-
Cabrera 2017).
Much of the literature on the evolutionary
dynamics of competition and cooperation focuses
on formal mathematical models that apply
insights from game theory. Models that focus
exclusively on the ultimate explanation of coop-
eration (i.e., the reason why cooperation evolved),
however, do not explain much about the psycho-
logical capacities or the specific neural systems
that implement those cooperative behaviors. This
is because cooperative behaviors could be
implemented by different sets of psychological
processes and neural structures that are function-
ally equivalent. As a result, a diverse range of
mechanisms could evolve by natural selection to
serve the same biological function. Many brain
structures can serve the same purpose, for
instance, in the same way that multiple morpho-
logical structures, such as wings in insects and
birds, were selected for flying. Conversely, atten-
tion to the proximate mechanisms of cooperation
(i.e., those psychological and biological substrates
that explain how the organism reacts in the way
that it does) helps to constrain evolutionary expla-
nations, narrowing down the specific path by
which cooperation could have emerged in a spe-
cies. Thus, considerations about the proximate
mechanisms of competition and cooperation are
crucial for building more detailed models of the
evolution of social behavior in humans and non-
human animals.
For the most part, this article will set aside
formal discussions in game theory and evolution-
ary game theory in order to focus on competition
and cooperation primarily as psychological phe-
nomena. This requires drawing a conceptual dis-
tinction between the evolutionary and the
psychological variants of these phenomena.
From a purely evolutionary point of view, compe-
tition and cooperation can be understood in terms
of the fitness consequences that a certain behavior
has. Competitive behaviors are those that provide
a fitness benefit for the actor and which are
selected for because of their beneficial effect on
the actor; cooperative behaviors, in contrast, are
those that provide a benefit to other individuals
and which are selected for because of their bene-
ficial effect on those individuals who receive the
fitness benefit. However, an organism need not
have a mind for either competition or cooperation
in the evolutionary sense. Viral and bacterial path-
ogens, for instance, cooperate in this sense when
they cause human respiratory diseases. Psycho-
logical competition and cooperation, in contrast,
are understood in terms of the intention of the
actor. While competitive behaviors are those
with which individuals intend to gain something
(e.g., by or establishing physical superiority over
others), cooperative behaviors are those
performed by individuals acting with the intention
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to benefit others, regardless of whether they intend
to benefit themselves.
The rest of the article is organized into three
sections. The first section outlines the conceptual
framework of peer competition, its developmental
trajectory, cultural differences, and the effect of
both biological and cultural factors on those dif-
ferences. The second section examines the psy-
chological literature on peer cooperation. For
theoretical purposes, the large body of empirical
research on peer cooperation will be divided into
two main lines of research: one focused on the
mechanisms for generating the benefit of cooper-
ation, and another focused on the mechanisms for
distributing it. Generating and distributing the
benefit are the two problems that individuals
need to solve in order to achieve and maintain
cooperation. Particular attention will be paid, to
how the psychological mechanisms that deal with
those problems emerge during human develop-
ment and how they arose in evolutionary time.
The third section focuses on the recent surge of
psychological research on shared intentionality.
The study of shared intentional psychology has
provided a new and fruitful research program for
understanding the distinctive nature of human
cooperation. Competing accounts concerning the
evolution and influence of shared intentionality on
human cooperation will be analyzed.
Peer Competition
Understanding the phenomenon of peer competi-
tion not only requires conceptual clarity about
what “competition”means but also some appreci-
ation of the nature of peers and peer groups.
Broadly construed, peers are those members of
one’s social group with whom one shares certain
social features such as age, interests, education,
and social status. Overall, peers are psychologi-
cally relevant because they are likely to influence
each other’s beliefs, values, and behavior.
Depending on our explanatory interests, some
features of social groups such as age and biolog-
ical sex might be especially important in defining
peer groups, while others such as spatial proxim-
ity might not. In many competitive sports, for
instance, the age and biological sex of players
are relevant to determining group membership,
while their spatial distribution across the field is
not. Careful attention to these defining features of
peer groups is important because they make some
patterns of social influence more salient than
others and peer groups may display different
forms of organization and social dynamics. For
example, different forms of interaction can be
observed among children of different ages, and
further patterns of interpersonal relationships can
be discovered when biological sex is taken into
consideration.
Derivatively, peer competition can be roughly
understood as the social interaction between at
least two organisms within a peer group for a
limited resource. Although, at a very general
level, all species engage in biological competition
to survive and reproduce, peer competition in
humans is characterized by a set of distinctive
psychological mechanisms. One salient difference
is that competition in our species is significantly
influenced by culture via implicit and explicit
social norms. The effect of culture on competitive
behavior is, of course, a function of different
biological factors that can be shaped by evolution-
ary forces. For example, while some adaptations
for peer competition emerge with age and encul-
turation, some others allegedly depend on biolog-
ical sex. Understood as the systematic study of the
biological basis of all social behavior, early socio-
biology tended to overemphasize the role of bio-
logical factors and the importance of biological
evolution in shaping human social behavior.
However, subsequent advances in evolutionary
psychology have become more conscious of this
limitation by paying more attention to the role of
culture and evolution-like processes of cultural
change. To the extent that distinctive forms of
human peer competition are largely determined
by cultural factors, the emergence of these special
forms of competitive behavior deserves further
discussion.
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Developmental Trajectory of Peer
Competition
While the relative impact of culture in human
competition increases with age, adaptations for
early peer competition seem to be strongly cana-
lized in development: the emergence of those
adaptations appears relatively impervious to vari-
ations in the environment or genotype of the
organism. For example, human newborns have
to compete for parental resources with both older
and even yet-to-be-born siblings, because parents
might continue to invest in their older children or
invest in a new offspring as soon as the mother
resumes ovulation. Thus, infants and toddlers
need to appeal to others by engaging caregivers
emotionally and, later in life, by monitoring their
tastes and intentions using specialized cognitive
mechanisms to secure adult attention (Hrdy 2009;
Tomasello and Gonzalez-Cabrera 2017).
These adaptations for early competition are
likely the result of concurrent processes of social
selection in which conspecifics compete for
access to resources other than mates. With the
evolution of cooperative breeding in Homo
erectus around 2–1.8 million years ago, hominin
mothers could have babies at more closely spaced
birth intervals than other apes due to the help
received from others. Cooperative breeding is a
social system in which offspring receive care not
only from their parents but also from other group
members, often called “alloparents.” Thus, in a
cooperative breeding system, mothers had to
divide their care and attention to offspring more
than other apes and to delegate responsibility for
their offspring’s care to alloparents. Children
would then have had to compete more actively
for care and attention, and they would have had to
learn to deal with different adults more flexibly.
During early (1–6 years of age) and middle
childhood (6–12 years of age), children are still
engaged in a process of competition with siblings
and peers for the care and attention of adults.
Children often obtain attention from adults by
making themselves useful to them in everyday
activities. This is especially clear in natural-
fertility populations in which people make no
conscious effort to control fertility and, therefore,
population growth depends primarily on physio-
logical and ecological factors affecting fecundity.
Children who are situated in these populations
help their parents and caregivers in various
ways, such as harvesting, fishing, collecting shell-
fish, and foraging for fruit (for a review, see
Kramer 2010). In doing so, they contribute signif-
icantly to their own consumption and the eco-
nomic output of the group.
Around age 6, children increasingly display
what is known as “interference competition.”
Interference competition occurs when an individ-
ual’s actions prevent another individual from
achieving a goal. This is a special form of com-
petition since it requires physical interference –
individuals may also compete with one another by
capturing resources faster than their competitors
without the need for physical interference. Peer
interference competition is a highly debated topic
in the literature, and this is due, in particular, to
gender and cross-cultural differences in the way it
is expressed. For example, it is commonly
assumed that males who actively attempt to pre-
vent others from achieving their goals may gain a
reproductive advantage. In contrast, empirical
evidence suggests that females engage in interfer-
ence competition primarily when resources are
scarce and that they avoid direct interference com-
petition to reduce the probability of incurring
physical harm through retaliation. The supposed
biological rationale behind these differences, as
one would expect from early sociobiological
models of social behavior, is that females bear
greater responsibility than males for their off-
spring’s survival. Hence, they must avoid physical
harm, including interference competition that
might lead to retaliation.
This view is supported by some cross-cultural
studies that indicate that female aggression is pri-
marily directed toward other women and that
physical aggression is typically used by a female
when her own life or her children’s lives are at
risk. Since elimination of direct competitors
through coalitionary support reduces the probabil-
ity of harmful retaliation when the coalition out-
numbers the victim, it is thought that social
exclusion is a more effective strategy among
females than males. Evidence from some Western
4 Peer Competition and Cooperation
samples seems to indicate that this strategy is
indeed more common among women (Benenson
et al. 2013). However, gender-based differences in
interference competition can be alternatively
explained as a response to male-dominated envi-
ronments as research on gender inequality in the
workplace in industrialized Western societies
seems to indicate. Further cross-cultural data is
therefore required to settle this debate.
As children become more enculturated, role
models and social norms begin to influence their
competitive behavior (see Fig. 1). While there are
few differences in children’s competitive behavior
during early childhood, children from different
cultural backgrounds begin to differ in their com-
petitive behavior by middle childhood. For exam-
ple, equal sharing is common among peers during
early childhood, especially when children collab-
orate to obtain a particular resource. However, as
will be discussed in the section below, develop-
mental trajectories for costly sharing diverge
across cultures around middle childhood, in line
with differences in the sociocultural niches that
children experience (Callaghan and Corbit 2018).
Cross-Cultural Differences in Peer
Competition
In general, the emergence of prosocial tendencies
seems stable across developmental niches, when
prosocial behavior is relatively low cost. None-
theless, cross-cultural differences become salient
under costly conditions in situations involving
both helping and sharing (Blake et al. 2016).
While disadvantageous inequity aversion
(avoidance of receiving less than a peer) emerges
by middle childhood across all populations stud-
ied, advantageous inequity aversion (avoidance of
receiving more than a peer) has been shown to
emerge only in some of the populations studied
and only later in development. Overall, these
results suggest that cross-cultural variation in
adult norms of resource distribution shapes the
acquisition of fairness behavior during childhood.
Adults influence children’s sharing behavior,
but the nature and extent of this influence varies
across populations. This variation might be
explained by differences in children’s imitation
of adult behavior in different cultural settings.
Children in collectivist societies exhibit higher
levels of imitation than children in individualist
societies for instrumental tasks such as the
retrieval of a prize from a puzzle box or a
necklace-making activity (Clegg and Legare
2016). Collectivist societies typically emphasize
obedience and conformity, especially children’s
obedience to authority figures such as parents
and elders, whereas individualist societies empha-
size children’s autonomy and independence.
Thus, it is thought that children in collectivist
societies obey authority figures more than
Infancy Early childhood Middle childhood Adolescence
Birth–1 year 1–6 years 6–12 years 12–20 years
Consequences:
– Increased interference competition
– Major cross-cultural differences
– Norm-driven peer competition
Biological factors Cultural factors
Peer Competition and Cooperation, Fig. 1 Consequences of cultural factors on peer competition through four
developmental stages before adulthood
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children in individualist societies, which results in
increased imitation.
The influence of adults and cultural variation
on competitive behavior often reduces potential
conflict as interference competition becomes
more common among children and adolescents.
Cultural norms about the distribution of resources,
for instance, shape social structures by regulating
dominance hierarchies among peers. Dominance
can be roughly understood as differential access to
resources, territory, and relative power over
others. Beginning in early childhood, implicit
dominance hierarchies are established based on
individual differences in physical prowess and
social skills. But individual differences in domi-
nance do not seem to significantly influence chil-
dren’s survival, as much of the necessary care and
attention is already provided by parents and other
adult caregivers. The importance of both domi-
nance hierarchies and local cultural norms for the
individual’s fitness comes later in life.
Norm-Driven Peer Competition
As children progress into middle childhood, dom-
inance is progressively determined by achieve-
ments in diverse cultural domains unique to
humans, such as intellectual, musical, artistic, or
athletic performance. Competition intensifies in
adolescence as individuals begin to compete for
reproductively attractive mates, which makes
them increasingly aware of their place within the
hierarchy. Most social interactions in children are
regulated by models provided by adults or
straightforward norms that decrease the cost of
competition among the young, facilitating them
to compete for social status. This is in stark con-
trast with chimpanzees who, along with the
bonobo, are one of the closest living relatives of
humans. Juvenile male chimpanzees do not form a
dominance hierarchy with their peers (Sandel
et al. 2017). One possible explanation for this is
that male chimpanzees begin to establish rank by
dominating adult females, but adolescent males
are often not physically prepared to face female
retaliatory behaviors. This is also likely the case in
bonobo populations in which there is no exclusive
male dominance.
Social norms can regulate peer competition in a
way that suppresses dominance hierarchies to a
significant degree. This is evident in hunter-
gatherer societies, which are consistently charac-
terized as egalitarian, in the sense that political
leadership is weak and ranking and stratification
among adult males is relatively absent. Egalitarian
behavior is found in a wide range of ecological
settings, indicating that this feature of their social
organization is the deliberate result of the group
members’ actions (Boehm et al. 1993). This egal-
itarian social structure, in particular, is considered
a consequence of reverse dominance hierarchies
in which leaders are dominated by subordinates
who disapprove of hierarchical behavior. In this
way, aggressive and competitive tendencies
among humans are reoriented through cultural
processes in a more prosocial direction.
These reverse dominance hierarchies are typi-
cally encoded in social norms that work as level-
ing mechanisms that prevent inequalities of
wealth, power, and prestige. Among the !Kung,
for instance, hunting success is known to be quite
variable, but successful hunters are denied the
opportunity to use their skills to build wealth and
prestige. Rather than technical limitations, it is the
value system of noncompetitive, egalitarian
hunter-gatherers that seems to limit the develop-
ment of agriculture. In these societies, sharing is
imposed, and the accumulation of personal pos-
sessions such as clothing, tools, weapons, or bead
ornaments is sanctioned. Hence, these rules
restrict both the progressive accumulation of
wealth and the necessary investments that make
agriculture possible.
Cross-cultural studies of behavior in experi-
mental economics reveal that models based on
self-interest often fail at predicting competitive
behavior in small-scale societies (Henrich et al.
2005). Experimental economics uses experimen-
tal methods to study theoretical predictions of
economic behavior. Research in this branch of
economics has used a wide range of experimental
paradigms including ultimatum, public goods,
and dictator games to show that cultural, group-
level differences such as degree of market
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integration (i.e., participation in wage labor and
market exchange) and the relative importance of
cooperation (i.e., the degree to which economic
life depends on cooperation with non-immediate
kin) significantly explain the level of prosociality
expressed in these experimental games.
This cooperative behavior covaries with the
costly punishment of noncooperative norm viola-
tors or, in other words, with the willingness of
group members to pay the costs of punishing
violators of prosocial group norms. Both evolu-
tionary models and experimental research suggest
that costly punishment is what allows norms of
fairness and other prosocial behaviors to remain
stable against invading defectors who behave in a
selfish or antisocial manner. Yet, costly punish-
ment is also able to stabilize arbitrary or even
maladaptive norms within the group. These
norms can spread in a population because, as the
experimental evidence shows, children are able to
imitate, for instance, the costly punishment of
both equal and unequal offers in economic
games from adult models, and the rates of imita-
tion increase with age (Salali et al. 2015). That is,
even when adults use costly punishment against
those whomake fair offers in experimental games,
children imitate this behavior as if they were
enforcing an antisocial norm of unfair behavior.
The above results illustrate how social norms
not only curb competition as seen in societies with
dominance hierarchies but can regulate competi-
tion in ways that favor increasingly hierarchical
societies as well. Hierarchical organization is
common in pre-state tribes headed by chiefs or
“big men.” Social organization in large-scale soci-
eties is also characterized by top-down power
structures. Differences in social organization are
fostered by variation in certain kinds of cultural
practices and institutions. Storytelling, for
instance, may help to broadcast social norms that
coordinate prosocial behavior and promote coop-
eration (Smith et al. 2017). The so-called big gods
and organized religion, in contrast, may foster the
rise of increasingly stratified societies. Big gods
are morally concerned deities who judge people’s
behavior and exert supernatural punishment over
norm transgressors. These moralizing gods are
thought to play an important role in the emergence
of complex societies by fostering prosocial behav-
iors such as cooperation and self-sacrifice
(Norenzayan 2013). However, although there is
a correlation between big gods and the rise of
politically complex societies, the rise of big gods
seems to have only played a causal role in
maintaining and promoting social inequality
(Watts et al. 2016).
In hierarchical social landscapes, individuals
will compete intensely to climb the social ladder,
which is not the case in societies with flatter social
structures. If the social structure is hierarchical,
individuals will try to optimize their position in
the hierarchy based on an initial set of biological
and culturally inherited conditions (such as edu-
cation or inherited wealth) via individual within-
group competition. This generates distinctive
selective regimes that act on human populations.
Egalitarian societies may have favored traits such
as cooperation and low fertility, while inequality
could have increased selection for within-group
competition for social status, high fertility, and
other selfish behaviors. Thus, individuals in the
highest social classes within stratified societies
may invest in cultural institutions that favor their
own social status.
This investment in cultural institutions creates
conditions for cultural group selection. Models of
cultural selection extend the Darwinian account of
evolution by natural selection in order to explain
cultural change. Cultural group selection, in par-
ticular, accounts for the evolution of cultural traits
as a function of the competitive advantage that
these traits confer to social groups. Most evolu-
tionary models assume that group-beneficial traits
are evolutionarily unstable. They are thought to be
unstable because selfish individuals who do not
collaborate with the group-beneficial traits can
thrive within the group. But social interactions
can result in multiple stable equilibria. This is
because many different forms of social organiza-
tion can become stable within a group if they are
sufficiently supported by social norms and if there
is concurrent punishment against norm violators
(Boyd and Richerson 1992). Religious beliefs
about big gods, for instance, are stable within the
group because they are coupled with severe social
sanctions and the threat of divine punishment,
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both of which deter free riding. Under these con-
ditions, the costs and benefits of a specific behav-
ior are transformed by the rewards and
punishments that are associated with those social
norms. With groups enforcing a variety of social
norms that regulate within-group competition,
selection can act upon different kinds of social
behavior as well as the social norms that make
them internally stable within the group.
On this view, an explanation of why stratified
societies evolved could implicate group-level
Darwinian processes. In other words, these socie-
ties evolved as a result of variation in norms that
regulate within-group competition, as well as the
selective advantage that more stratified societies
obtain as a result of between-group competition.
Simulation modeling suggests that stratified soci-
eties are more able to survive resource shortages
in variable environments by secluding mortality
in the lower classes and thus keeping the popula-
tion low relative to carrying capacity (Rogers et al.
2011). In both variable and constant environmen-
tal conditions, the demographic instability that is
generated by unequal access to resources also
results in intense migration. This migration, in
turn, drives the spread of such societies and the
social norms that favor unequal resource distribu-
tion, even when population size is relatively
small.
Moreover, since stratified agriculturalist socie-
ties were able to grow bigger by producing more
food and resources, they were also more moti-
vated, arguably, to expand and conquer neighbor-
ing territories, creating a strong incentive to invest
in organized warfare. Evidence for warfare among
prehistoric hunter-gatherers exists, but this evi-
dence becomes clearer in the archaeological
record during the beginning of the agricultural
revolution around 10,000 years ago, when
humans transitioned from hunting and gathering
to farming.
To sum up this section, the developmental tra-
jectory of human peer cooperation is character-
ized by the increasing importance of culture. As
children becomemore enculturated, cross-cultural
differences in competitive behavior become more
salient. These cultural differences owe primarily
to social norms that regulate peer competition
within the group – either by diminishing hierar-
chical social organization or by supporting it. The
evolutionary stability of these norms depends on
costly punishment, which can be transmitted early
in childhood via imitation of adult models. As will
be discussed in the next sections, social norms do
not only regulate peer competition but depend on
distinctive forms of peer cooperation for their
existence. In the human lineage, the psychological
mechanisms of peer competition and cooperation
are highly intertwined.
Peer Cooperation
Norm-driven forms of peer competition are
closely connected to human cooperative skills
since they require norm compliance. The fact
that people routinely comply with norms is genu-
inely puzzling since individuals frequently have
selfish evolutionary interests in violating them.
Certainly, norms can be enforced by costly
forms of punishment. However, costly punish-
ment is paradoxical precisely because it is an
extreme form of cooperation that requires the
agent to refrain from incentives to avoid carrying
out punishment.
Peer cooperation can be roughly understood as
a type of social interaction in which at least one
individual acts with the intention to foster the
benefit of other group members, regardless of
whether those actions benefit the actors them-
selves. When individuals cooperate without
regard to their own self-interest, their behavior is
considered a case of psychological altruism. The
form of costly punishment discussed in the previ-
ous section, for instance, is often considered psy-
chologically altruistic. However, not all
cooperative behavior is altruistic in this sense.
Mutualistic cooperation can be motivated by pru-
dential reasons: an individual can cooperate with
another because of the foreseen immediate or
delayed returns of their cooperative behavior.
Understanding how cooperation evolves is not
only a central issue in evolutionary biology but
also in the psychological sciences. Various
accounts of those cognitive abilities that are
thought to be unique to humans often link the
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evolution of those features to the evolutionary
history of cooperation in our lineage. From col-
lective hunting to cooperative breeding, coopera-
tion is a defining feature of human social life. For
example, collaborative hunting, as observed
among hunter-gatherers, seems to require the
mastery of a set of special cooperative skills that
go beyond those we see in our closest evolution-
ary relatives, the chimpanzee and the bonobo.
This is because collaborative hunting relies on
cognitive capacities such as role and task division,
joint plans, and shared commitment, which are,
arguably, uniquely human. To distinguish this
psychologically rich form of cooperation from
its less sophisticated counterparts, it will hereon
be referred to as “collaboration.”
The Two Problems of Peer Cooperation
Explanations of the evolution of cooperation have
primarily focused on what is sometimes called
“the problem of distributing the benefit of coop-
eration”– namely, how cooperation can be
maintained in the face of free riders that gradually
undermine cooperative enterprises. This problem
arises because cooperation requires groups to dis-
tribute the benefit of these ventures in ways that
incentivize individuals to cooperate over time.
But, as a rule of thumb, individuals have a strong
incentive to free ride – i.e., to obtain the benefits of
cooperation without paying the costs of generat-
ing it. As a result, free riding individuals become
more successful than cooperators who bear the
cost of cooperative activities, causing cooperation
to progressively decline in the population. How-
ever, explaining the evolution of cooperation
demands not only an explanation of how the ben-
efit is distributed but also of how it is generated.
Successful cooperation sometimes requires skills
for communication, division of labor, or task com-
mitment that explain how the benefit is generated
in a cooperative interaction. This problem is
called “the problem of generating the benefit of
cooperation” (Calcott 2008).
These two problems can be illustrated by a
two-person “stag hunt” game, which involves a
situation of social coordination. In this game, two
hunters (or players) must decide simultaneously
whether to hunt for stag or hare. Each player can
successfully hunt a hare alone, which makes hare
hunting the safer option. Hunting a stag, in con-
trast, requires cooperation from both players. If
the two hunters agree to cooperate, they can suc-
cessfully catch a stag, which is the preferred and
more valuable game. If both players succeed in
hunting a stag, the game is shared equally, as
described in the payoff matrix in Table 1. This
matrix defines, then, a solution to the problem of
distributing the benefit of cooperative hunting:
equal sharing. However, choosing to hunt a stag
is risky since the other player may choose not to
cooperate. If that is the case, the hunter who
decides to go after the stag ends up empty-handed
since the successful hunting of a stag requires both
players. Thus, in order to generate the benefit of
cooperative hunting, the two players need to coor-
dinate their choices and to trust each other in their
commitment to hunting a stag.
This distinction is psychologically relevant
since mechanisms dealing with these two prob-
lems might be supported by two distinct sets of
psychological mechanisms that are dissociated in
both development (ontogeny) and evolution
(phylogeny) (for a review, see Warneken 2018).
On this view, while the capacity to generate the
benefit of cooperation has evolutionary roots that
we share, for the most part, with other great apes,
there is little evidence that our ape relatives pos-
sess similar skills for distributing this benefit. This
set of skills, furthermore, has a distinctive devel-
opmental onset. While many key skills for gener-
ating benefit through cooperation arise early in
Peer Competition and Cooperation, Table 1 Payoff
matrix of a generic two-person stag hunt game, where
a > b  c > d. The payoff defined in the top-right corner
cell describes a situation in which Player 1 decides to hunt a
stag and Player 2 decides to hunt a hare. In this scenario,
Player 1 obtains a payoff of c, and Player 2 obtains a
payoff of b
Player 1
Stag Hare
Player 2 Stag a, a c, b
Hare b, c d, d
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human development, the mechanisms responsible
for distributing it in ways that protect cooperation
against defection are acquired later, for they
strongly depend on children’s acquisition of
local social norms. For example, while basic
capacities for helping, costly sharing, and collab-
orating arise relatively early during the first
2 years of age, mechanisms that help to distribute
the benefit of cooperative activities – such as
partner choice, partner fidelity, inequity aversion,
and reputation management – begin to emerge at
3 years of age or later during middle childhood
(see Table 2).
The Ontogeny of the Mechanisms for
Generating and Distributing the Benefit
of Peer Cooperation
There is significant evidence for the partial disas-
sociation in ontogeny of the psychological mech-
anisms responsible for generating and distributing
the benefit of cooperation. Young children are not
only able to identify cooperative partners but also
seem to prefer them over uncooperative ones, as
measured by their reaching behavior and prefer-
ential looking. By 2 years of age, children already
possess context-sensitive expectations about
equal resource distribution. At this age, for
instance, children expect an experimenter to give
a reward to each of two individuals who have
worked together to complete a task, but not
when only one of them has done all the work. It
seems, however, that children’s evaluations are
only able to regulate their social interactions in
the cooperative direction later on in development.
For example, 17- and 22-month-olds tend to help
both antisocial and prosocial adult partners
despite their preference for prosocial individuals,
and 3-year-olds share indiscriminately in experi-
mental tasks involving distribution of resources.
The best example of the delayed emergence of
mechanisms for distributing the benefit of coop-
eration is children’s development of inequity aver-
sion. Although children seem to expect an equal
distribution of resources at a very young age,
aversion to unexpected unequal distributions
emerges significantly later. In fact, the two forms
of inequity aversion discussed in the section on
Cross-Cultural Differences in Peer Competition
follow different developmental trajectories.
While disadvantageous inequity aversion
develops around 4 years, advantageous inequity
aversion begins to emerge at around 8 years of age
(McAuliffe et al. 2013).
The Phylogeny of the Mechanisms for
Generating and Distributing the Benefit
of Peer Cooperation
While chimpanzees and bonobos have basic
capacities for generating the benefit of coopera-
tion (such as skills for helping, sharing, and
cooperating in mutualistic ways), they lack the
distinctive machinery for solving the problem of
distributing the benefit of cooperation. First, when
a human or conspecific fails to retrieve an object
that is out of reach, chimpanzees can engage in
instrumental helping and even select the correct
tool from a set of options. Second, although only
bonobos seem to be able to engage in active forms
of food sharing, chimpanzees are also capable of
sharing food with conspecifics in a passive way.
They give food to others, for instance, when the
food is difficult to monopolize or when they expe-
rience harassment from a beggar. Third, several
studies with both species of African apes,
Peer Competition and Cooperation, Table 2 Time of
onset of children’s skills for generating and distributing the
benefit (see Warneken 2018)
Time of onset
Skills for
generating the
benefit
Skills for distributing
the benefit
18 months  Helping
18 months  Costly sharing
14–18 months  Collaborating
21 months  Partner choice
3 years  Disadvantageous
inequity aversion
3.5 years  Partner fidelity
5 years  Reputation
management
7–8 years  Advantageous
inequity aversion
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chimpanzees and bonobos, indicate that they can
cooperate with other conspecifics in a mutualistic
fashion. For example, some studies have shown
that chimpanzees will wait for a partner in a coop-
erative task, when the partner is necessary for
solving the task and, therefore, for obtaining the
food reward. They even actively solicit help from
them or help them (e.g., by opening the door of the
enclosure), so they can cooperate in the task.
Perhaps the most salient, but controversial,
examples of the phylogenetic disassociation of
the mechanisms for distributing the benefit
between humans and other apes come from stud-
ies on partner choice and inequity aversion. While
human children prefer helpers over mean partners,
great apes prefer dominant individuals as these
social relationships determine access to mating
opportunities, food, and other resources. Even
bonobos prefer individuals that hinder others
over those that help. Yet, some researchers have
argued that primates possess a sense of fairness.
Their reason for doing so is that primates react
aversely to experimenters when they see a con-
specific receive better food than themselves
(Brosnan and de Waal 2003). However, evidence
for a sense of fairness in nonhuman animals have
been somewhat difficult to replicate under more
controlled conditions (Sheskin et al. 2014), leav-
ing the phenomenon open to alternative explana-
tions. A different account of these aversive
reactions, for instance, is that seeing another indi-
vidual receive high-quality food generates the
expectation in the subject of receiving the same
type of food. In fact, subsequent experiments in
chimpanzees suggest that these reactions are bet-
ter characterized as frustration for not getting the
expected food, rather than aversive reactions
based on a sense of fairness or some sort of social
comparison with what conspecific partners obtain.
To summarize this section, explanations of
peer cooperation require an account of how the
benefit of cooperative ventures is distributed
among group members, so that free riding does
not undermine cooperation over time. Moreover,
it needs an explanation of how the benefit of
cooperation is generated. Psychological evidence
indicates that humans possess specialized mecha-
nisms for addressing these two problems. While
basic capacities for generating the benefit of coop-
eration through helping, sharing, and collaborat-
ing arise relatively early in development,
mechanisms for resolving the problem of distrib-
uting the benefit of cooperation – such as partner
choice, partner fidelity, inequity aversion, and
reputation management – only begin to emerge
later during middle childhood.
Peer Cooperation and Shared
Intentionality
Even though great apes and humans seem to share
many of the skills required for generating the
benefit of cooperation, there are still important
differences in how humans and other apes address
this problem. A significant body of research in
developmental and comparative psychology
shows that human cooperation is characterized
by a set of unique skills that fall under the
umbrella concept of shared intentionality. Shared
intentionality is the capacity to coordinate social
interactions through the sharing of mental states
such as goals and beliefs. In the stag hunt game
discussed in the previous section, for instance,
both players could solve the problem of generat-
ing the benefit of cooperation by sharing their
intention to create a committed partnership to
hunt a stag.
Cooperative skills for shared intentionality
seem to be in conflict with the idea that the mech-
anisms dealing with the two problems of peer
cooperation explained in the previous section
can be easily dissociated in both ontogeny and
phylogeny. Indeed, skills of shared intentionality
begin to emerge early in the context of child-adult
interactions, but they continue to develop well
into adulthood in the context of peer interactions.
One notable example is collaborative hunting in
hunter-gatherers, which relies on joint goals and
plans, task and role division, and shared commit-
ment that begin to emerge during childhood.
Moreover, skills of shared intentionality seem
unique within the ape lineage, for comparative
research has systematically shown that nonhuman
great apes, with whom we share a common ances-
tor around 7 mya, systematically fail tests of
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shared intentionality (Call 2009). Thus, these
skills are hypothesized to be adaptations for gen-
erating the benefit of cooperation that emerged,
due to selective pressures unique to the hominin
lineage, from an ape-like common ancestor who
lacked these capacities.
Shared intentionality explains many of the fea-
tures that make human cooperation different from
great ape cooperation (Tomasello and Carpenter
2007). The shared intentionality hypothesis states
that the distinctive nature of human cooperation is
due to behavioral differences produced by the
presence of these abilities in the human lineage.
Different social and cooperative skills that were
likely present in our ape ancestors seem to have
been transformed by shared intentionality (see
Table 3). First, great apes understand what other
individuals see, but they simply follow another’s
gaze to see if they are looking at something inter-
esting, e.g., a piece of food. If they see nothing
rewarding or valuable to them, they quickly stop
looking. Human children are also able to see what
others see, but they are also capable of sharing the
attentional state in a way that involves mutual
awareness that the experience is shared, as well
as a shared interest in the object or event. From a
very young age, for instance, children are able to
gaze at adults, point to an object, and then return
their gaze back to the person with whom they are
interacting. Children tend to focus their attention
on objects and events that others are attending to
because they seem to find it intrinsically reward-
ing to share those experiences with others. This
facilitates the cooperative exchange of
information. For example, children tend to show
adults objects that are interesting to them and, in
turn, follow an adult’s gaze to experience what is
interesting for them. Adults can similarly bring
objects in their surroundings to an infant’s atten-
tion solely by using eye gaze. This creates a psy-
chological common ground that enables both
cooperative communication and collaborative
activities with joint goals.
Second, nonhuman apes use gestures and sig-
nals only to get what they want from one another,
while young children also use gestural communi-
cation for cooperative purposes. Nine-month-old
human infants often direct other people’s attention
to objects through gestures aimed to initiate joint
attentional interactions. Twelve-month-old
infants use pointing to share interest and attention
with adults as well as to inform others of things
they might not have seen or knowwhen there is no
benefit for themselves (Liszkowski et al. 2006).
Third, while nonhuman great apes regularly
engage in group activities such as hunting, these
activities do not seem to involve individuals
cooperating through shared goals to which they
are all both committed and mutually aware of one
another’s commitment. Group hunting may be
cooperative, but not necessarily “collaborative”
in the psychological sense specified at the begin-
ning of the previous section. Experimental evi-
dence suggests that 18- and 24-month-old
children understand group activities around
shared goals as involving commitment from all
the parties involved. At this age, infants actively
encourage an unresponsive adult to rejoin a game
by communicating with them in various ways. In
contrast, in the same experimental situation, chim-
panzees never try to reengage their partners but
rather focus on solving the task by themselves
(Warneken et al. 2006).
Fourth, while social learning in nonhuman
great apes is mostly opportunistic (since individ-
uals gather information from others unilaterally,
copying only the actions that are relevant to
achieve the desired result), human infants focus
on causally irrelevant actions that they think are
intentionally demonstrated by an adult. In other
words, children imitate adult models in the sense
that they learn the detailed actions that others
Peer Competition and Cooperation, Table 3 Basic
social and cooperative skills in great apes that are trans-
formed by human-shared intentionality (see Tomasello and
Carpenter 2007)
Individualistic
(great apes: chimpanzees
and bonobos)
Collaborative
(humans: 1-year-olds
and infants)
 Gaze following  Shared attention
 Social manipulation  Cooperative
communication
 Group activity  Collaboration
 Social learning  Instructed learning
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perform (in a seemingly intentional way) to gen-
erate a certain outcome. If an adult demonstrator
knocks a music box three times before making it
work, children will tend to do the same, even if
they know the action is instrumentally irrelevant
for making the box play the music. Opportunistic
learning in nonhuman apes, in contrast, biases
learning toward the emulation of causally relevant
actions. Moreover, as in the music box example,
adults often demonstrate to children what they
should do, which makes learning a cooperative
activity. When adults provide communicative
cues that they are demonstrating something (e.g.,
by saying “This is the way we do it” or “This is the
way it works”), 14-month-old infants copy the
specific actions adults use much more often than
when they do not explicitly instruct. If adults do
not provide those cues, young children tend to
only copy the result the adult achieved (Gergely
and Csibra 2006). Remarkably, older children
around the age of 2 not only learn imitatively,
but they also seem to understand group activities
with peers as normatively grounded (Rakoczy and
Schmidt 2013). For example, when they learn
from a model that a certain activity is performed
in a certain way, children enforce the conventional
rules of the activity when others violate them.
The Cooperative Origins of Shared
Intentionality
Traditionally, the evolutionary origins of shared
intentionality have been linked to obligate coop-
erative foraging, especially collaborative hunting.
According to the interdependence hypothesis, our
early ancestors had none of the adaptations for
vertical climbing, forelimb suspension, and
knuckle-walking. This precluded them from seek-
ing protection by quickly climbing to the trees or
engaging in the type of hunting that we sometimes
see in chimpanzees. Given the local predatory
fauna, foraging alone (seeds, tubers, or meat)
would have been a very dangerous task. Foraging
and scavenging in a group for safety then became
necessary during the Middle Pleistocene around
780 kya. In order to face those challenges,
hominins required new adaptations for
collaborative foraging. When nonhuman great
apes face situations in which they need to decide
whether to forage alone or cooperate with others
to obtain a food reward, they lack the skills of
coordination and communication that facilitate
the reliable coordination of action, especially in
the context of risky coordination problems such as
the aforementioned stag hunt game (see Table 1).
Thus, on this view, hominin ancestors likely
lacked these adaptations until the selective pres-
sures for obligate cooperative foraging came into
effect, creating the conditions for the gradual evo-
lution of more planned and coordinated foraging
in the human lineage.
One trouble with this traditional evolutionary
account of shared intentionality is that it does not
explain why many of these capacities emerge so
early in ontogeny. According to an alternative
account, the cooperative breeding hypothesis,
the key selective pressures responsible for the
development of shared intentionality were linked
to cooperative breeding, which likely evolved in
H. erectus around 1.9 mya. This new rearing
environment allowed humans to wean infants rel-
atively early and, in doing so, reduce the time
periods between pregnancies. This situation, as
explained earlier in the section on the Develop-
mental Trajectory of Peer Competition, increased
competition between siblings and peers who must
monitor the whereabouts and intentions of adults
in order to secure their care and attention (Hrdy
2009).
Consistent with this scenario, it has been
argued that cooperative breeding could have
selected for skills of shared attention in infants.
Shared attention is not simply parallel attention.
Operationally, an infant is sharing attention with
her caregiver when (i) the focus of the infant and
caregiver’s attention is directed to the same object,
(ii) the infant is able to track the caregiver’s focus
of attention, and (iii) the infant engages caregivers
just for the sake of sharing with them that atten-
tional state. Unlike human infants, nonhuman
great apes do not seem able to share attention or
other experiences with members of their own spe-
cies. Chimpanzees and bonobos are indeed able to
meet a version of condition (i) by focusing their
attention in parallel to the same object. They can
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even meet similar requirements to those stated in
condition (ii) by tracking other individuals’ atten-
tional states in competitive contexts such as food
seeking. However, since these species seem to be
motivated to follow another’s individual gaze
only for instrumental and competitive purposes,
they crucially fail to satisfy condition (iii). Thus, it
has been claimed that cooperative breeding
favored the emergence of shared attention in our
lineage because gestures and eye contact would be
crucial to direct adults’ attention to objects, to
events, and to themselves, just for the sake of
sharing with them pleasurable experiences that
foster attachment and care.
Similarly, basic forms of cooperative commu-
nication could have also been a consequence of
the early emergence of these shared intentional
skills, for they could have emerged pre-
linguistically in the form of pointing and
pantomiming. Nonhuman great apes sometimes
point for humans in an imperative way, e.g.,
when they want an out-of-reach object. In con-
trast, human infants across different cultures point
declaratively from around their first birthday. At
that crucial developmental stage, human infants
become highly motivated to share their interest in
different objects and events by offering, showing,
and pointing declaratively to them.
Overall, all these uniquely human infant
behaviors would have evolved in the context of
sibling and peer competition. For in the context of
cooperative breeding, infants compete with each
other to provide adults with positive affective
feedback in order to secure care and attention.
As a result, they could have used these skills to
reward adults by sharing emotions, interest, and
attention with them. Shared intentionality would
have begun as an ontogenetic adaptation, i.e., as
part of a sequence of specialized changes that
enabled infants to survive the cooperative breed-
ing environment created by their parents.
However, as it will be explained in the next
section, it is also likely that these early mecha-
nisms of shared attention and basic cooperative
communication coevolved as mechanisms to
facilitate social learning (and perhaps even teach-
ing), when adult activities required skills that
demanded prolonged periods of preparation and
maturation. This view explains the developmental
trajectory of human skills for peer cooperation as
the result of selective pressures for both coopera-
tive breeding and cooperative foraging. These
selective pressures are thought to collapse into
each other during middle childhood – a develop-
mental period in which children’s dependence
extends from their parents and other caregivers
to cooperative peers. Thus, although some capac-
ities for shared intentionality emerge early in
ontogeny, others appear relatively late to support
the generation of benefits via peer cooperation.
The Role of Ontogeny in the Evolution of
Human Peer Cooperation
Accounts of the evolution of human cooperation
have started to pay increasing attention to theoret-
ical work in evolutionary developmental biology
or “evo-devo” for short. Evo-devo focuses on how
developmental processes evolve. A key tenet of
this research program is that many evolutionary
processes result from changes in developmental
timing. Building upon this program, a recent
hypothesis about the role of ontogeny in the evo-
lution of human cooperation considers the trade-
offs that emerge during the different stages of
human development in order to provide an evolu-
tionary account of the ontogeny of human coop-
erative capacities (Tomasello and Gonzalez-
Cabrera 2017). An advantage of this account is
that it not only explains the evolutionary emer-
gence of those traits but also their distinctive
developmental trajectory.
The evo-devo hypothesis of the evolution of
human cooperation integrates insights from both
the interdependence hypothesis and the coopera-
tive breeding hypothesis. As in the cooperative
breeding hypothesis, it maintains that shared
intentional capacities were initially geared to
dyadic interactions between infants and care-
givers. As children grow older, the model simi-
larly assumes that most of the attention of adults is
redirected toward younger individuals, which
makes engaging caregivers progressively more
complex. Yet, as time progresses, children also
become more physically capable of helping and
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collaborating. Learning how to make themselves
useful to adults in their everyday activities would
have been a possible way to gain such care and
attention. This is a plausible assumption given
how significant children’s contribution is for the
overall economy of extant natural-fertility
populations. By the age of 5, for instance, Hadza
children provide 50% of their own caloric intake.
Among subsistence agriculturalists, Maya boys
provide 50% of what they consume, while girls
produce the same percentage by the age of 6, once
subsistence work includes food processing and
household tasks (see Kramer 2010). As a result,
basic abilities for shared intentionality and collab-
oration in early human children could have sub-
sequently extended into adjacent developmental
periods. This is an expected result of the selective
advantages these skills provide in adulthood, at
the cost of little or no disruption in the overall
cognitive development of the organism. For
example, basic skills for shared attention, cooper-
ative communication, helping, and collaboration
would have presumably conferred a great selec-
tive advantage to hunting partners in a context in
which cooperative foraging was necessary for
subsistence.
Moreover, building upon the interdependence
hypothesis, the evo-devo model of human coop-
eration assumes that selective pressures stemming
from increased interdependence created demands
for more complex adaptations for coordination,
communication, and shared commitment. These
adaptations progressively moved “upstream” into
childhood as a preparation for adult activities, in
the sense that they began to emerge earlier in
development. Most of this preparation would
have occurred during middle childhood as it is in
this developmental period that children need to
learn how to make decisions with others with little
or no adult supervision. They are typically low-
risk decisions such as choosing those activities
that interest them and match their level of compe-
tence. But these decisions must be fair and impar-
tial as participation is voluntary rather than forced.
Children must interiorize the social benefits of
sharing resources with others and learn how to
be reliable cooperative partners. Thus, the transi-
tion to middle childhood opened a window of
opportunity to learn key cooperative skills in
low-risk contexts where failure to cooperate was
not lethal.
A prime example of this is children’s early
skills for reputation management and normatively
grounded cooperation. Reputation management is
the capacity to adjust one’s behavior in order to be
judged by others in a more positive light. Norma-
tively grounded cooperation refers to one’s capac-
ity to understand cooperative activities as
involving commitment and to enforce those com-
mitments. These skills could have initially
emerged in adult individuals as adaptations for
cooperative foraging. Later in evolution, they
could have begun to emerge progressively earlier
in development. This is because longer periods of
maturation for these skills would have given indi-
viduals an evolutionary advantage when collabo-
rative foraging was necessary for human
subsistence. The primary selective pressures
would have proceeded mainly upstream from
adulthood and adolescence to childhood, enhanc-
ing their sensitivity to shared commitment and to
the reputational effects of their own cooperative
behavior. Arguably, this capacity did not evolve in
the context of child-adult interactions since these
relationships are hierarchically structured and,
therefore, much more sensitive to other factors
such as authority and fear of punishment. In con-
trast, starting from adolescence, individuals must
collaborate with others for basic subsistence. Indi-
viduals with enough time to develop complex
skills of shared intentionality, such as a capacity
to form shared commitments and enforce them
normatively, would gain a selective advantage.
Moreover, since the networks of allies and friends
that children build during this period will endure
into adulthood, investing in a progressively earlier
onset of complex skills for peer collaboration
would have made a nontrivial difference in their
fitness.
Consistent with this hypothesis, human child
development is longer when compared with any
other great ape. It also includes the appearance of
middle childhood as a developmental period
between infancy and puberty that is distinct from
the juvenile stage of other great apes (Thompson
and Nelson 2011). Traces of this process can be
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observed in the increasing awareness of the child
about their own social reputation and the norms
that regulate their social environment. Unlike
nonhuman great apes, human children seem to
be concerned about others’ evaluations of their
cooperative and prosocial tendencies because
they appear to adjust their behavior based on
their prediction of how others will assess this
behavior. Experimental results indicate that
5-year-old human children, but not chimpanzees,
share more and steal less when they are being
watched by a peer than when they are alone
(Engelmann et al. 2012). Between 6 and 7 years
of age, children begin to enact fairness norms
against selfish individuals and exhibit a deeper
understanding of the normativity of social rules
as arising from social agreement and commitment
(McAuliffe et al. 2017).
To conclude this section, a number of alterna-
tive hypotheses have been advanced to explain the
evolution of human cooperative skills of shared
intentionality. The interdependence hypothesis
argues that cooperative skills of shared intention-
ality evolved due to the selective pressures of
cooperative foraging in the hominin lineage,
while the cooperative breeding hypothesis
explains its emergence as a result of the selective
demands of cooperative breeding. An alternative
approach, grounded in theoretical insights from
evolutionary developmental biology, explains the
emergence of cooperative abilities for shared
intentionality as a consequence of adaptive
changes in developmental timing stemming from
both selective pressures. Further research on the
evolutionary basis of human cooperation should
focus on refining and testing these alternative
hypotheses.
Conclusion
Human peer competition is determined by several
biological factors (e.g., age, gender, and physiol-
ogy) and cultural factors (e.g., social norms). The
degree to which each of these factors drives
human social behavior, however, is a matter of
dispute. Arguably, the influence of cultural factors
increases with age as children become
increasingly aware of the customs, norms, and
values of their groups. Peer competition starts
early in development as children must strive for
adult attention due to human rearing environ-
ments of cooperative breeding that are unique
among other great apes. As time progresses, com-
petition becomes increasingly regulated by norms
that influence social behavior, including sharing
and distributing resources. These norms likely
explain cultural differences in peer competition.
Some evolutionary models might, as illustrated by
some accounts of the correlation between big gods
and the rise of politically complex societies, over-
state the role of social norms in thwarting within-
group peer competition. However, social norms
can also intensify resource and status competition
by stabilizing hierarchical social organization
through different forms of normatively driven
punishment.
Competition and cooperation among peers are,
as we have seen, interconnected phenomena.
When human peers compete over resources, they
often do so by cooperating with others. Similarly,
norm-driven forms of peer competition are closely
connected to human cooperation because they
require norm compliance. From a theoretical
point of view, cooperating with peers involves
psychological mechanisms for generating and dis-
tributing the benefit of cooperative ventures.
Extensive empirical research suggests that several
psychological mechanisms that allow humans to
deal with the problem of generating the benefit are
shared with other nonhuman great apes. Mecha-
nisms for distributing the benefit in humans are, in
contrast, more distinctive: specifically, they are
closely connected with norms that regulate
within-group competition. Somewhat more con-
troversially, some evolutionary-minded psychol-
ogists have recently argued that the distinctive
trajectory of these two classes of mechanisms is
evident in ontogeny as well as phylogeny. Con-
troversy about this distinction in phylogeny
comes mainly from the literature on fairness and
inequity aversion in nonhuman animals. The fact
that capacities for shared intentionality are
uniquely human, and that some of them, at least,
begin to emerge relatively late in development,
also provides grounds for skepticism concerning
16 Peer Competition and Cooperation
the notion of a distinctive ontogenetic and phylo-
genetic trajectory.
Humans are characterized by psychological
mechanisms of shared intentionality that have
helped to coordinate increasingly complex coop-
erative activities in the hominin lineage. In this
sense, shared intentionality can be understood as a
uniquely human capacity for generating the ben-
efit of cooperation. Shared intentionality trans-
forms several social skills that humans share
with great apes such as chimpanzees and bonobos.
Three basic accounts of the evolution of shared
intentionality have been proposed in the literature:
the interdependence hypothesis, the cooperative
breeding hypothesis, and the evo-devo hypothesis.
The first account explains the evolution of coop-
erative skills of shared intentionality as result of
selection for collaborative foraging in adults. The
second argues that these skills evolved due to the
selective demands of cooperative breeding. The
third approach explains the emergence of these
abilities through a composite explanation: selec-
tive pressures for cooperative breeding in humans,
in addition to changes in developmental timing in
adult skills for collaborative foraging that required
longer periods of maturation, jointly explain the
evolution of cooperative skills. Evidence for this
hypothesis can be found in the distinctive devel-
opmental pattern of middle childhood in humans.
Choosing between these competing hypotheses,
however, requires further investigation.
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